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RUEHFK/AMCONSUL FUKUOKA 2500
RUEHOK/AMCONSUL OSAKA KOBE 6101
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RUEHIN/AIT TAIPEI 6579
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TOKYO 003682

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TAGS: [PREL](#) [JA](#) [KS](#) [KN](#) [PGOV](#) [MOPS](#) [MARR](#)
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR'S MEETING WITH VICE FOREIGN MINISTER
YACHI

Classified By: Ambassador J. Thomas Schieffer. Reasons: 1.4 (b)(d).

11. (C) Summary: Vice Foreign Minister Shotaro Yachi and Ambassador Schieffer, in a meeting on August 9, discussed extension of the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law for the JMSDF Indian Ocean mission, strengthening information security, and Japan's next generation fighter aircraft. End summary.

Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law

12. (C) Vice Foreign Minister Shotaro assured Ambassador on August 9 that, despite the ruling coalition's election setback, the Government of Japan (GOJ) intended to extend for "one or two years" the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law authorizing the Japan Maritime Self Defense Forces support mission in the Indian Ocean. Yachi said the GOJ was asking other countries, citing Oman specifically, to help by making positive public statements about Japan's role. The Ambassador pointed out that in his meeting the previous day with Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) leader Ichiro Ozawa, he had emphasized the importance of Japan's international contribution, noting this was not just a bilateral issue. He noted that Pakistan, the only Muslim country in the maritime task force, was currently commanding the fleet and particularly was in need of the kind of fuel Japanese ships were able to provide.

13. (C) Ambassador Schieffer noted that in his breakfast meeting earlier in the day, he had urged Chief Cabinet Secretary Shiozaki to reach out for support to other

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Ambassadors representing countries in the Indian Ocean task force. He added that the U.S. Embassy was willing to help organize briefings for all members of the Diet, with a special effort extended to the DPJ. He suggested conducting the briefings around the second week in September. North American Affairs Director General Nishimiya suggested that a compilation of statistics showing how much the task force had achieved (e.g., amount of narcotics seized) would help make the case for extending the mission. The Ambassador cautioned him on that approach, observing that the very presence of the task force almost certainly had resulted in a decrease in

terrorist and criminal activity, making an analogy with the use of metal detectors at airports that, by their very presence, curtail terrorism.

¶4. (C) VFM Yachi assured the Ambassador that the Liberal Democratic Party's (LDP) coalition partner, Komeito, would remain solidly behind extension of the Special Measures law. On the other hand, he continued, Komeito was likely to back off on issues such as constitutional revision. Despite this, Yachi said, Prime Minister Abe was determined to continue working toward constitutional revision.

¶5. (C) VFM Yachi welcomed the inauguration of the Bilateral Information Security Task Force (BISTF) to address the issue of strengthening protection of sensitive information. Ambassador Schieffer said that the U.S. was pleased as well, noting in particular the breakthrough that had been achieved with multi-agency participation on both sides. He observed the BISTF was off to a very good start and that we now needed to follow through. The Ambassador noted that, initially, senior levels on both sides had recognized the value of the BISTF process, but that lower levels apparently had been worried about being blamed for existing shortcomings. He emphasized that was not the U.S. objective; rather, we wanted to work together to fix the problems. VFM Yachi also mentioned the GSOMIA signing scheduled for August 10, which the Ambassador noted he would sign with pleasure.

¶6. (C) VFM Yachi briefly noted that there had been some recent "minor" problems on Okinawa involving military vehicles and asked that U.S. forces be more "cautious."

¶7. (C) Yachi immediately turned to the issue of Japan's next generation fighter, saying the government was still

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interested in the F-22, and asking for U.S. "cooperation." The Ambassador responded that this acquisition was probably going to be Japan's most important fighter purchase. He observed that it was very important for U.S. and Japanese forces to be complementary. Since it was inconceivable that any war involving Japan would not involve the U.S. as well, it was essential that our air forces be complementary, he said. The Ambassador said it was difficult to imagine that the Obey Amendment would be removed. He added that, although we would not cite this publicly, Japan's recent failures to protect sensitive information also were a negative influence.

He noted that if Japan were to acquire the F-22, then the ROK would want the aircraft as well. The Ambassador pointed out that Australia had opted for the F-35, which had even more advanced technology than the F-22, having concluded the F-22 would not be releasable for foreign sale. In sum, the Ambassador said, it was difficult to envision any foreign sales of the F-22.

SCHIEFFER